Events & Attacks

Here, we describe the attacks carried out for the test set of each scenario along with benign actions conducted by the grid operator.


Some attacks leave the grid in an undesired state such that a dedicated counter action has to be conducted by the grid operator. After that, a short period of time passes before the grid reaches its desired operating state. The timing of the countermeasures and the time the grid has recovered from the attack’s impact is included in the table as well. Please note that the “Recovered” time is a (worst-case) estimation to ease the evaluation of IDSs. The grid might be in a stable state earlier.

01-Basic

Training

IDTypeAttackStart TimeDurationCountermeasureRecoveredDescription
1Cable maintenanceFalse0:21:230:00:30The control center issues control commands to disconnect a cable, enabling maintenance personnel safe interactions with the cable.
2Generator ControlFalse1:34:18The control center issues a control command to (re)connect a generator to the grid.
3Transformer maintenanceFalse3:09:04The control center issues control commands to enable the maintenance of an MV/LV transformer
4Separator movementFalse5:17:460:00:05The control center issues control commands to move the separator position by closing and opening switches.
5Generator controlFalse6:08:07The control center issues a command to set the power infeed of a generator to 700 kW.
6Manual commandsFalse6:53:30Manual commands
7Generator ControlFalse7:38:11The control center issues a control command to reduce the power infeed of a generator.

Test

IDTypeAttackStart TimeDurationCountermeasureRecoveredDescription
1IndustroyerTrue1:11:240:03:001:14:571:15:27The attackers perform an industroyer-like attack, repeatedly sending commands to disrupt grid operations
2Drift OffTrue1:38:520:08:071:47:29As an MitM, the attackers perfom a drift-off attack manipulating measurements sent to the control center
3IndustroyerTrue2:12:110:02:502:15:472:16:17The attackers perform an industroyer-like attack, repeatedly sending commands to disrupt grid operations
4Generator Infeed ControlFalse2:45:11The control center sends commands to reduce the active power infeed of a generator to 75% (15 kW)
5Control & FreezeTrue3:11:320:06:003:19:143:19:44As a MitM, the attackers perform a control & freeze attack: First, measurements at one or multiple RTUs are recorded and their trend is interpolated. Then, control commands to disrupt the grid’s operation are inserted into the active connection(s). Future measurements are manipulated to mimic the former trend, hiding the attack’s effects (e.g., a local blackout) from the control center.
6Cable MaintenanceFalse4:05:210:00:40The operator changes the grid’s topology by opening and closing switches to allow for a cable maintenance, i.e., by completely disconnecting the respective line.
7ARP Spoofing DoSTrue4:11:230:02:064:14:00Using ARP Spoofing, the attackers interfere with the connections between the control center and one or multiple RTUs
8IndustroyerTrue4:55:280:03:055:00:005:00:30The attackers perform an industroyer-like attack, repeatedly sending commands to disrupt grid operations
9Separator MovementFalse5:28:560:00:07The operator issues control commands to move the separator in an open ring to optimize the power flow and reduce load on affected lines.
10Drift OffTrue5:47:420:08:145:56:27As an MitM, the attackers perfom a drift-off attack manipulating measurements sent to the control center
11Control & FreezeTrue6:15:360:09:106:26:316:27:01As a MitM, the attackers perform a control & freeze attack: First, measurements at one or multiple RTUs are recorded and their trend is interpolated. Then, control commands to disrupt the grid’s operation are inserted into the active connection(s). Future measurements are manipulated to mimic the former trend, hiding the attack’s effects (e.g., a local blackout) from the control center.
12IndustroyerTrue6:43:270:03:016:47:056:47:35The attackers perform an industroyer-like attack, repeatedly sending commands to disrupt grid operations
13Transformer MaintenanceFalse7:05:21The operator issues control commands to disconnect an MV/LV transformer from the grid, allowing safe maintenance.
14Control & FreezeTrue7:24:330:05:587:32:297:32:59As a MitM, the attackers perform a control & freeze attack: First, measurements at one or multiple RTUs are recorded and their trend is interpolated. Then, control commands to disrupt the grid’s operation are inserted into the active connection(s). Future measurements are manipulated to mimic the former trend, hiding the attack’s effects (e.g., a local blackout) from the control center.
15Drift OffTrue7:56:280:09:548:06:53As an MitM, the attackers perfom a drift-off attack manipulating measurements sent to the control center
16IndustroyerTrue8:11:580:02:578:16:238:16:53The attackers perform an industroyer-like attack, repeatedly sending commands to disrupt grid operations
17Generator Infeed ControlFalse8:32:42The control center issues control commands to change the infeed of a generator.
18Control & FreezeTrue8:46:440:05:318:53:418:54:11As a MitM, the attackers perform a control & freeze attack: First, measurements at one or multiple RTUs are recorded and their trend is interpolated. Then, control commands to disrupt the grid’s operation are inserted into the active connection(s). Future measurements are manipulated to mimic the former trend, hiding the attack’s effects (e.g., a local blackout) from the control center.
19IndustroyerTrue9:18:570:02:529:22:20The attackers perform an industroyer-like attack, repeatedly sending commands to disrupt grid operations
20ARP Spoofing DoSTrue9:51:050:02:089:53:44Using ARP Spoofing, the attackers interfere with the connections between the control center and one or multiple RTUs
21Control & FreezeTrue10:04:270:09:2010:14:3310:15:03As a MitM, the attackers perform a control & freeze attack: First, measurements at one or multiple RTUs are recorded and their trend is interpolated. Then, control commands to disrupt the grid’s operation are inserted into the active connection(s). Future measurements are manipulated to mimic the former trend, hiding the attack’s effects (e.g., a local blackout) from the control center.
22Transformer Tap ControlFalse10:26:40The control center issues a control command (Step Down) to change the tap position of a transformer, influencing the voltage at the lower voltage side of the transformer.
23IndustroyerTrue10:32:190:02:5810:36:0810:36:38The attackers perform an industroyer-like attack, repeatedly sending commands to disrupt grid operations
24Drift OffTrue10:46:320:08:1710:55:20As an MitM, the attackers perfom a drift-off attack manipulating measurements sent to the control center
25Transformer Tap ControlFalse11:07:00The control center issues a control command (Step Up) to change the tap position of a transformer, influencing the voltage at the lower voltage side of the transformer.
26Topology ChangeFalse11:32:500:00:30The operator issues control command to change the grid’s topology
27Topology ChangeFalse11:37:020:00:24The operator issues control command to change the grid’s topology, reducing the load on a specific part of the grid
28Cable MaintenanceFalse11:52:110:00:44The control center issues control commands to allow for a cable maintenance. To reduce the load on the remaining lines, the infeed of a generator is reduced.

02-Semiurban

Training

IDTypeAttackStart TimeDurationCountermeasureRecoveredDescription
1Seperator MovementFalse0:58:450:00:20The control center issues control commands to move the open segment of an open ring
2Transformer MaintenanceFalse1:45:150:06:40The control center issues control commands to fully disconnect an MV/LV transformer from the grid to enable safe maintenance. Afterward, the transformer is reconnected.
3Generator BootstrapFalse2:43:13The control center issues a control command to connect a new generator to the grid
4Generator ControlFalse3:19:36The control center issues a control command to reduce the power infeed of a wind turbine
5Seperator MovementFalse4:15:200:00:14The control center issues control commands to move the open segment of an open ring
6Close RingFalse6:33:44The control center issues a control command to close a previously open ring
7Open RingFalse7:18:24The control center issues a control command to open the previously closed ring
8Generator ControlFalse8:52:04The control center issues a control command to reduce the power infeed of a wind turbine
9Generator ControlFalse10:49:41The control center issues a control command to restore the power infeed of a wind turbine

Test

IDTypeAttackStart TimeDurationCountermeasureRecoveredDescription
1ARP Spoofing DoSTrue0:23:230:02:160:26:09ARP Spoofing DoS against 5 RTUs
2Control & FreezeTrue0:32:380:05:580:39:070:39:37The MitM issues a control command to disconnect the low voltage section of a DSS
3IndustroyerTrue0:53:290:03:010:57:000:57:30The attacker sends repeated control commands to disconnect a section of the grid by opening a switch
4Transformer MaintenanceFalse1:13:430:06:00The control center issues control commands to disconnect an MV/LV transformer, enabling safe maintenance of this transformer
5ARP Spoofing DoSTrue1:23:130:02:331:26:16ARP Spoofing DoS against 4 RTUs
6Separator MovementFalse1:47:440:00:33The control center issues commands to move the separator within an open loop to another line
7Drift OffTrue2:03:370:08:052:12:13The MitM manipulates the voltage measurements of 4 buses, dissembling an undervoltage situation
8Control & FreezeTrue2:33:310:11:182:45:202:45:50The MitM issues a control command to slowly reduce the power infeed of two generators
9Drift OffTrue2:46:360:08:152:55:21The MitM manipulates the voltage measurements of a bus to fluctuate, dissembling a faulty measurement device
10Generator BootstrapFalse3:10:50The control center issues a command to connect a previously inactive wind turbine to the grid
11IndustroyerTrue3:28:360:02:503:31:573:32:27The attacker sends repeated control commands to disconnect a section of the grid by opening a switch
12ARP Spoofing DoSTrue3:49:120:02:043:51:46ARP Spoofing DoS against 3 RTUs
13Drift OffTrue4:02:480:09:554:13:14The MitM manipulates the voltage measurements of a bus to increase to ~1.38 pu, dissembling a local overvoltage situation
14Generator ControlFalse4:18:48The control center issues a command to modify the power infeed of a wind turbine
15Control & FreezeTrue4:41:320:09:164:51:194:51:49As a MitM, the attackers perform a control & freeze attack: First, measurements at one or multiple RTUs are recorded and their trend is interpolated. Then, control commands to disrupt the grid’s operation are inserted into the active connection(s). Future measurements are manipulated to mimic the former trend, hiding the attack’s effects (e.g., a local blackout) from the control center.
16Control & FreezeTrue4:52:340:05:264:58:314:59:01As a MitM, the attackers perform a control & freeze attack: First, measurements at one or multiple RTUs are recorded and their trend is interpolated. Then, control commands to disrupt the grid’s operation are inserted into the active connection(s). Future measurements are manipulated to mimic the former trend, hiding the attack’s effects (e.g., a local blackout) from the control center.
17Drift OffTrue5:09:570:08:165:18:43The MitM manipulates voltage and power measurements, dissembling an increase in power infeed
18ARP Spoofing DoSTrue5:25:270:02:025:27:59ARP Spoofing DoS against a single RTU
19Control & FreezeTrue5:36:370:09:185:46:285:46:58As a MitM, the attackers perform a control & freeze attack: First, measurements at one or multiple RTUs are recorded and their trend is interpolated. Then, control commands to disrupt the grid’s operation are inserted into the active connection(s). Future measurements are manipulated to mimic the former trend, hiding the attack’s effects (e.g., a local blackout) from the control center.
20Drift OffTrue6:05:250:09:556:15:50The MitM manipulates the measurements of a line, dissembling an increase in loading.
21Cable MaintenanceFalse6:25:420:00:01The control center issues commands to fully disconnect a line, enabling safe maintenance of this line
22Drift OffTrue6:37:470:09:076:47:25The MitM manipulates measurements of multiple loads, dissembling an irregular behavior
23ARP Spoofing DoSTrue6:59:140:02:127:01:57ARP Spoofing DoS against 3 RTUs
24ARP Spoofing DoSTrue7:11:110:01:457:13:26ARP Spoofing DoS against a single RTU
25IndustroyerTrue7:28:540:03:067:32:317:33:01The attacker sends repeated control commands to open and close different switches
26IndustroyerTrue7:40:130:03:017:43:45The attacker sends repeated control commands to force a switch to stay closed
27Separator MovementFalse7:56:550:00:16The control center issues commands to move the separator within an open loop to another line
28Drift OffTrue8:12:430:08:098:21:23The MitM manipulates voltage measurements of multiple buses
29Close RingFalse8:49:51The operator issues a control command to close a previously open ring within the grid topology
30IndustroyerTrue9:12:230:02:589:15:529:16:22The attacker sends repeated commands to reduce the active power of a storage
31IndustroyerTrue9:23:510:02:539:27:149:27:44The attacker sends repeated control commands to open switches, disconnecting a part of the grid
32IndustroyerTrue9:33:540:02:589:37:239:37:53The attacker sends repeated control commands to disconnect the low voltage grid at a specific transformer
33Drift OffTrue9:47:010:07:219:54:53The MitM manipulates measurements of multiple loads, dissembling an irregular behavior
34Open RingFalse10:00:39The operator issues a control command to open the previously closed ring within the grid topology
35Drift OffTrue10:35:260:15:4010:51:37The MitM manipulates measurements of a load, dissembling an extreme increase in demand
36IndustroyerTrue10:52:320:03:4010:56:4210:57:12The attacker sends repeated control commands to disconnect a load from the grid
37IndustroyerTrue11:12:300:03:1411:16:1511:16:45The attacker sends repeated control commands to disconnect a generator from the grid
38Generator ControlFalse11:25:33The control center issues a control command to reduce the power infeed of a wind turbine
39Generator ControlFalse11:34:35The control center issues a control command to restore the power infeed of a wind turbine

03-Rural

Test

IDTypeAttackStart TimeDurationCountermeasureRecoveredDescription
1Generator ControlFalse0:15:49The control center issues a control command to change the power infeed of a hydro electric turbine
2IndustroyerTrue0:38:210:02:520:41:440:42:14The attacker sends repeated control commands to open switches, disconnecting a part of the grid
3ARP Spoofing DoSTrue1:00:140:01:481:02:32ARP Spoofing DoS against two RTUs
4Drift OffTrue1:10:300:16:101:27:11The MitM manipulates measurements of a load, dissembling an extreme increase in demand
5Close RingFalse1:37:00The operator issues a control command to close a previously open ring within the grid topology
6Control & FreezeTrue1:54:110:11:372:06:192:06:49The MitM issues a control command to slowly reduce the power infeed of two generators
7Control & FreezeTrue2:26:300:09:372:36:382:37:08As a MitM, the attackers perform a control & freeze attack: First, measurements at one or multiple RTUs are recorded and their trend is interpolated. Then, control commands to disrupt the grid’s operation are inserted into the active connection(s). Future measurements are manipulated to mimic the former trend, hiding the attack’s effects (e.g., a local blackout) from the control center.
8Drift OffTrue2:42:390:07:302:50:40The MitM manipulates voltage measurements of multiple buses
9ARP Spoofing DoSTrue3:06:510:02:023:09:23ARP Spoofing DoS against a single RTU
10Control & FreezeTrue3:26:030:08:553:35:283:35:58The MitM issues a control command to disconnect a DSS
11Drift OffTrue3:43:470:09:383:53:55The MitM manipulates the voltage measurements of a bus to increase to ~1.38 pu, dissembling a local overvoltage situation
12Generator ControlFalse4:07:47The control center issues a command to modify the power infeed of a wind turbine
13Drift OffTrue4:22:290:07:574:30:57The MitM manipulates the voltage measurements of 4 buses, dissembling an undervoltage situation
14ARP Spoofing DoSTrue4:39:470:01:574:42:15ARP Spoofing DoS against 4 RTUs
15ARP Spoofing DoSTrue5:04:220:02:185:07:10ARP Spoofing DoS against 2 RTUs
16Control & FreezeTrue5:16:180:05:255:22:145:22:44As a MitM, the attackers perform a control & freeze attack: First, measurements at one or multiple RTUs are recorded and their trend is interpolated. Then, control commands to disrupt the grid’s operation are inserted into the active connection(s). Future measurements are manipulated to mimic the former trend, hiding the attack’s effects (e.g., a local blackout) from the control center.
17IndustroyerTrue5:35:050:02:595:38:345:39:04The attacker sends repeated control commands to disconnect the low voltage grid at a specific transformer
18IndustroyerTrue5:51:500:03:395:56:005:56:30The attacker sends repeated control commands to disconnect a load from the grid
19Control & FreezeTrue6:03:550:09:156:13:416:14:11As a MitM, the attackers perform a control & freeze attack: First, measurements at one or multiple RTUs are recorded and their trend is interpolated. Then, control commands to disrupt the grid’s operation are inserted into the active connection(s). Future measurements are manipulated to mimic the former trend, hiding the attack’s effects (e.g., a local blackout) from the control center.
20Cable MaintenanceFalse6:35:02The control center issues commands to fully disconnect a line, enabling safe maintenance of this line
21Drift OffTrue6:56:580:08:537:06:21The MitM manipulates voltage and power measurements, dissembling an increase in power infeed
22Separator MovementFalse7:13:020:00:33The control center issues commands to move the separator within an open loop to another line
23ARP Spoofing DoSTrue7:33:130:02:157:35:59ARP Spoofing DoS against 4 RTUs
24ARP Spoofing DoSTrue7:46:090:02:127:48:52ARP Spoofing DoS against 3 RTUs
25IndustroyerTrue8:05:180:03:018:08:50The attacker sends repeated control commands to force a switch to stay closed
26IndustroyerTrue8:17:320:02:578:21:008:21:30The attacker sends repeated commands to reduce the active power of a storage
27IndustroyerTrue8:35:350:03:058:39:118:39:41The attacker sends repeated control commands to open and close different switches
28Drift OffTrue8:52:390:07:409:00:50The MitM manipulates measurements of multiple loads, dissembling an irregular behavior
29Separator MovementFalse9:32:480:00:16The control center issues commands to move the separator within an open loop to another line
30Drift OffTrue9:38:120:09:409:48:23The MitM manipulates measurements of multiple loads, dissembling an irregular behavior
31IndustroyerTrue10:16:380:02:5010:19:5910:20:29The attacker sends repeated control commands to disconnect a section of the grid by opening a switch
32Drift OffTrue10:29:020:08:2710:37:59The MitM manipulates the voltage measurements of a bus to fluctuate, dissembling a faulty measurement device
33IndustroyerTrue10:42:530:03:0010:46:2410:46:54The attacker sends repeated control commands to disconnect a section of the grid by opening a switch
34Open RingFalse10:57:04The operator issues a control command to open the previously closed ring within the grid topology
35Generator ControlFalse11:11:49The control center issues a control command to reduce the power infeed of a wind turbine
36Drift OffTrue11:46:240:09:5911:56:54The MitM manipulates the measurements of a line, dissembling an increase in loading.

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